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ABSTRACT: This paper deals with the neo-Heideggerian approach in cognitive science as 
espoused by Michael Wheeler in his Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step (2005). 
According to Wheeler, this next step amounts to incorporating Heideggerian insights bearing 
on online intelligence: the kind of intelligence which is exhibited by human agents in 
embedded, embodied coping. However, this phenomenological reception implies also stripping 
Heideggerian phenomenology of its overt antinaturalistic and transcendental tendencies. The 
approach is indeed ‘neo-Heideggerian’ inasmuch as tantamount to a naturalization of 
phenomenological themes. I attempt to put this naturalizing aspiration to the test, and show 
that the approach remains ‘Heideggerian’ only superficially.    
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NEO-HEIDEGGERIAN COGNITIVE SCIENCE 
Michael Wheeler’s project for reconstructing the cognitive world (2005) can be viewed 
as a reflection on the philosophical foundations of cognitive science, concerned with 
helping in the search for a sort of Kuhnian revolution in the field (2005, p. 15). A 
project which is essentially Heideggerian. According to Wheeler’s understanding of the 
field’s history, this revolutionary twist has been emerging over the last few years as a 
response to orthodox cognitive science—basically, GOFAI1 and connectionism, that is, 
“most cognitive science as we know it” (idem). Although the countermovement has 
1 John Haugeland famously christened the oldest approach to achieving AI ‘Good Old Fashioned 
Artificial Intelligence’—or GOFAI, for short. What is crucial in defining what GOFAI amounts to, as a 
branch of cognitive science, “rests on a particular theory of intelligence and thought—essentially 
Hobbes’s idea that ratiocination is computation” (Haugeland 1989, p. 112). 
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adopted various names throughout its brief existence2 and despite its identity being 
admittedly somewhat amorphous, it is customary to refer to it as embodied-embedded 
cognitive science. And this, believes Wheeler, because embodiment and embedding 
are part of “a central and distinctive theoretical tendency within the more nebulous 
movement” (2005, p. 11). As Clark claims, “talk of mind as intimately embodied and 
profoundly environmentally embedded shimmers at the cusp of the cognitive scientific 
zeitgeist” (2012, p. 275). In order to pin down why this new science of mind (Rowlands 
2010) abjures of orthodox cognitive science, its aims and scope need some clarification. 
According to Wheeler, “the embodied-embedded approach revolves around the 
thought that cognitive science needs to put cognition back in the brain, the brain back 
in the body, and the body back in the world” (idem). Incidentally, this purpose is 
substantially akin to the ambitions of Andy Clark’s 1997 book titled with a decisively 
Heideggerian connotation: Being There. Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again. On 
Clark’s understanding, the new trend thinks it necessary “to abandon the idea 
(common since Descartes) of the mental as a realm distinct from the realm of the body; 
to abandon the idea of neat dividing lines between perception, cognition, and action; 
to abandon the idea of an executive center where the brain carries out high-level 
reasoning; and most of all, to abandon research methods that artificially divorce 
thought from embodied action-taking” (1997, pp. xii-xiii). Wheeler adheres overtly to 
the principles encompassing this novel program. His own project, construed as a 
reflection on the philosophical foundations of cognitive science, targets precisely 
Cartesian philosophy as the mindset dominating cognitive science from which the new 
approach needs to escape (1995; 2008). As is widely known, Heidegger criticizes 
Descartes boldly in Sein und Zeit while claiming at the same time that the cogito sum is no 
firm footing—as Descartes supposed. On the contrary, claims Heidegger, “what he left 
undetermined when he began in this ‘radical’ way was the kind of Being which belongs 
to the res cogitans, or—more precisely—the meaning of the Being of the sum” (SZ § 6, p. 24). 
Bluntly put, on Heidegger’s view, the Cartesian cogito sum gives us no special insight 
into the nature of the sum itself. Be that as it may, Wheeler wants to revise both the 
traditional interpretation to which Descartes has often been subjected to in Anglo-
American philosophy (as the resolute representative of a far-fetched and, for that very 
reason, unacceptable dualism) and—something which will be dealt with in due 
2 For Marsh (2007), for example, Wheeler’s theoretical heroes fall within a loose coalition of anti-
representationalism or anti-Cartesianism under the rubric of dynamical-, embodied-, extended-, 
distributed-, and situated theories of cognition, or DEEDS, to use an acronym. But his is hardly the only 
acronym in use. The movement is sometimes referred to as 4E cognitive science, standing for embodied, 
embedded, extended and enactive cognitive science (Rowlands 2010), or as 4EA, adding affective 
cognition to the equation (Protevi 2010).    
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course—Heidegger’s appraisal in cognitive science, which more often than not is 
understood as a mystical threat unable to contribute anything constructive to the field. 
That is to say, Wheeler wants to criticize the Cartesian assumptions underlying 
orthodox cognitive science but he will neither simply interpret Descartes’s philosophy 
drawing heavily from Heidegger’s own critique, nor interpret Heidegger, à la Dreyfus 
(see Dreyfus 2007), as the staunch critic who would never accept the theoretical 
possibility of cognitive science. It must be possible to do both: to show Descartes’s 
pervading influence on cognitive science and to embrace simultaneously Heideggerian 
insights without subscribing tout court to the consequences of his philosophy. This is 
precisely what Wheeler attempts to do.   
Now, first a few words on Descartes. According to the standard interpretation of 
Descartes, the French philosopher was a substance dualist who ascribed preeminence 
to the inmaterial res cogitans over the res extensa and whose work has been easily 
superseded by the contemporary developments of cognitive science. If the mind is 
inmaterial, then it follows that it cannot be subjected to scientific inquiry. But Wheeler 
shows how this picture is rather a simplification of Descartes and why he should not be 
underestimated, since he was actually one of the early proponents of the 
mechanization of mind. As a matter of fact, quoting from Descartes’s Traité de l’homme, 
Wheeler argues that “Descartes takes a range of capacities that many theorists, even 
now, would be tempted to regard as psychological in character, and judges them to be 
explicable by appeal to nothing more fancy than the workings of the bodily machine” 
(2008, pp. 312-313). It is but stressing the accent on Descartes’s dualism what has given 
rise to covert Cartesians within cognitive science, since it does not suffice simply to 
claim, for instance, that Descartes’s neurophysiology was wrong—which it certainly 
was—nor even that it would be preposterous to suggest a similarity between the 
Cartesian soul and the contemporary scientific attempts at a theory of consciousness. 
The point is rather that deep explanatory principles and assumptions underlying work 
in contemporary cognitive science are decisively Cartesian. Therefore, one had better 
map out the course of these presuppositions of Cartesian descend. 
On Wheeler’s view, a series of Cartesian principles comprising Descartes’s 
cognitive psychology must be identified in order to investigate as to what extent they 
remain parasitic in cognitive science. The Cartesian foundations bedeviling the 
cognitive enterprise are, however, exhibited by Wheeler as entering a period of quite 
dramatic reconstruction (for instance, in dynamical systems research), and his idea is 
that this reconstruction requires a more fundamental transformation in the 
philosophical foundations of the discipline. Wheeler’s argumental strategy consists in 
pointing out eight principles of Cartesian psychology, and then argue that these 
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principles “define a conceptual position toward which orthodox cognitive science 
tends overwhelmingly to gravitate, and at which it regularly comes to rest” (2005, p. 
56). These principles include the following claims: 
 
· The subject-object dichotomy is a primary characteristic of the cognizer’s 
ordinary epistemic situation (p. 23). 
· Mind, cognition, and intelligence are to be explained in terms of 
representational states and the ways in which such states are manipulated and 
transformed (p. 24). 
· The bulk of intelligent human action is the outcome of general-purpose 
reasoning processes that work by (i) retrieving just those mental representations 
that are relevant to the present behavioral context, and then (ii) manipulating 
and transforming those representations in appropriate ways so as to determine 
what to do (p. 38). 
· Human perception is essentially inferential in nature (p. 42). 
· Perceptually guided intelligent action takes the form of a series of sense-
represent-plan-move cycles (p. 43). 
· In typical cases of perceptually guided intelligent action, the environment is no 
more than (i) a furnisher of problems for the agent to solve, (ii) a source of 
informational inputs to the mind (via sensing), and, most distinctively, (iii) a kind 
of stage on which sequences of preplanned actions (outputs of the faculty of 
reason) are simply executed (p. 45). 
· Although the informational contents carried by bodily sensations and certain 
primitive perceptual states may have to be specified in terms that appeal to 
particular bodily states or mechanisms, the cognitive-scientific understanding of 
the operating principles by which the agent’s mind, given that information, then 
proceeds to generate reliable and flexible intelligent action remains conceptually 
and theoretically independent of the scientific understanding of the agent’s 
physical embodiment (p. 51).      
· Psychological explanation is temporally austere, in that it is neither necessary 
nor characteristically typical for good scientific explanations of mental 
phenomena to appeal to richly temporal processes (p. 53).    
It goes without saying that Wheeler is not arguing that the aforementioned 
principles of Cartesian psychology are shared verbatim in its entirety by every program 
and model in cognitive science. The ‘Cartesian-ness claim’—the claim that orthodox 
cognitive science is founded on Cartesian principles—is that it is a modern species of 
Cartesian psychology. So as it happens, the neurophysiological facts between what we 
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now know and what Descartes knew might differ, but the conceptual framework can, 
however, be kept intact. Accordingly, the Cartesian principles do not need to be 
shared identically but it must be possible to present evidence that each of the eight 
principles of Cartesian psychology are either “(i) an assumption made by at least the 
vast majority of orthodox cognitive scientists, ahead of the business of constructing 
specific explanations, or (ii) a core feature of certain paradigmatic, influential, or 
flagship examples of orthodox cognitive-scientific research” (Wheeler 2005, p. 56).  
Typically, systems designed from the standpoint of orthodox cognitive science take 
perceptually guided intelligent action to be a series of sense-represent-plan-move cycles 
(Wheeler 2005, p. 67). The architectural blueprint behind this conception of action is 
what Brooks (1999) called the sense-model-plan-act (SMPA) framework: a cognitive 
architectural framework that Brooks rejects for it dissociates perception and action. 
Take Shakey: a robot designed in the late 1960s at the Stanford Research Institute 
(Nilsson 1984) that embodies the typical technological implementation committed to 
SMPA. Shakey has visual images that are received via a black-and-white television 
Shakey, manufactured by SRI 
 
 JETHRO MASÍS 163 
monitor, it represents images based on a model of the world built as a set of first-order 
predicate calculus, and the world model is delivered to a central planning system 
called STRIPS based on a GPS architecture. Finally, in order to move, STRIPS-
generated action-specifying expressions are decoded into a format appropriate for 
driving the motors (Wheeler 2005, p. 69). For generating action, Shakey must appeal 
to its internal world-model, where conventions have been established for representing 
doors, wall faces, rooms, objects, and the robot’s status (Nilsson 1984, p. 19). Under 
such robotic world-modeling, the environment is understood as no more than a source 
of problems, obstacles, ambience information, and settings for action, but not as 
constituting cognition or playing any distinctive role in the formation of intelligence. 
From this follows an important conclusion for the philosophy of mind pervading 
orthodox cognitive science: what is important from the point of view of cognition must 
be then located in the head. Hence cognition is essentially intracranial.    
A further example provided by Wheeler as evidence of the ‘Cartesian-ness’ of 
traditional cognitive science is Marr’s computational investigation into the human 
representation and processing of visual information (2010), according to which the 
underlying task of vision is to reliably derive properties of the world from images of it. 
On Poggio’s view, “the central tenet of Marr’s approach is that vision is primarily a 
complex information processing task, with the goal of capturing and representing the 
various aspects of the world that are of use to us” (1981, p. 3). Most importantly, for 
Marr these representations are to be conceived of as context independent, given that 
they are not the product of any fundamental embedding or a result of the specific 
context of action, but rather of mere neural activity. This intracranial environmentally 
detached ‘neurocentrism’ is an essential tendency at work within orthodox cognitive 
science: 
According to such a view, although both the agent’s nonneural body (e.g., 
muscular adaptations, the geometric properties of limbs) and the agent’s 
environment are clearly essential, in some sense, for intelligent action to occur as 
it does, the processes that account for the richness and flexibility that are 
distinctive of such behavior remain fundamentally neural (e.g., neurally realized 
mechanisms of inference, discrimination, estimation, and route planning). Put 
another way, the message is that the causal factors that explain the adaptive 
richness and flexibility of naturally occurring intelligent behavior are located 
neither in the agent’s nonneural body nor in her environment, but pretty much 
exclusively in her brain. (Wheeler 2005, p. 81) 
The dispute behind this rejection of neurocentrism is between contingent 
intracranialism and contingent transcranialism (Adams & Aizawa 2009). According to 
the former, tool use—a commonplace in situated cognition and the extended mind 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 164 
hypothesis3—is a matter of intracranially localized cognitive processes interacting with 
extracranial biological, chemical, and physical processes (Adams & Aizawa 2009, p. 
78). So vision, for example, is essentially cognitive and begins in the retina. The 
transcranial approach, on the other hand, emphasizes noncognitive processes which 
span the cranial boundaries and extend into extracranial space. As such, due to its 
noncognitive emphasis, it tends to be regarded by intracranialists as a threat to 
cognitive science. Whereas for the former approach meaning is decisively in the head, 
for the latter “we do not store the meaningful inside ourselves, but rather live and are 
at home in it” (Haugeland 1998, p. 231). The intracranialist would reply that that is 
beautiful poetry, because the condition for living and being at home in such a way 
presupposes the primary contribution of neural activity.  
It is true that Descartes did not (and could not) have any developed neuroscientific 
knowledge at his disposal. Rather, his explanations were modeled on the basis of a 
system of hydraulics: nerve fibers stretching organs, tensions and relaxations closing or 
opening brain cavities releasing a flow of animal spirits through a corresponding point 
of the pineal gland (Wheeler 2008, p. 310). But that does not annul the fact that, on 
Wheeler’s words, “if we shift to a more abstract structural level of description, what 
emerges from that theory is a high-level specification for a control architecture, one 
that might be realized just as easily by a system of electrical and biochemical 
transmissions—that is, by a system of the sort recognized by contemporary 
neuroscience—as it is by Descartes’s ingenious system of hydraulics” (2008, pp. 310-
311). The point is that neurocentrism is committed to the Cartesian view of the 
explanatory disembeddedness of intelligent action, whereby the environment is one of 
two things, or both at the same time: (i) a furnisher of problems for the agent to solve 
(as exemplified by the typical tasks entrusted to robots designed on the basis of the 
SMPA framework, like Shakey), or (ii) a source of informational inputs to the mind via 
sensing (as exemplified in Marr’s computational theory of vision). From the standpoint 
of orthodox cognitive science, explaining vision is understanding how the brain builds 
up an internal model of the world based on light reception and inference from external 
traits. In contrast, “the subject of the new vision science is explaining why it seems to 
us as if the brain does this, when in fact it does not” (Noë 2002, p. 140). Consequently, 
Noë—another apostle of the new science of mind—defends a radical anti-
3 The fundamental reference regarding the extended mind hypothesis is, of course, the famous paper 
penned by Clark and Chalmers titled precisely ‘The Extended Mind’ (2010; originally published in 1998). 
This hypothesis is the first formulation of transcranialism: “an active externalism, based on the active role of 
the environment in driving cognitive processes” (Clark & Chalmers 2010, p. 27). In another paper, Adams 
and Aizawa (2010) have defended the bounds of cognition, that is, the fundamental intracranial character 
of cognition. 
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Cartesianism: “my position is simple: Cartesian neuroscience has no empirical support 
for its basic assumption that conscious experience is an exhaustively neural 
phenomenon” (2002, p. 173).     
So Descartes stands firm in the middle of this dispute. He can certainly be mocked 
for postulating the pineal gland as the interface between mind and matter, where 
physical stimuli are converted into perceptions and representations, and where motor 
instructions are turned into physical processes due to its involvement in important 
processes such as imagination, sensation, memory, and the causation of bodily 
movements. This is the typical arrogance of our contemporaries: they can look back in 
the past and laugh at how wrong philosophers of foregone epochs got the facts. 
However, Wheeler reminds us that even though for contemporary orthodox cognitive 
scientists Descartes’s pineal gland does not exist and even arouses derision, an 
explanatory interface responsible for the conversion of physical stimuli into 
representational and perceptive processes does! (2005, p. 85). That is to say, the 
refinement of the facts does not revoke the underlying explanatory framework. On 
Wheeler’s account, today’s pineal gland can be located over the point of the body 
where sensory transducers convert physical stimuli into representational states and 
where motor transducers convert representational states into physical processes 
producing bodily motions (idem). To say it with Haugeland, transducers are AI’s 
answer to the pineal gland: “the relevant transductions would have to take place within 
the brain, between one part of it and another—not so far from the pineal gland, as 
luck might have it (1998, p. 228). Central to this underlying explanatory framework is 
the Cartesian idea that the mental is an ontologically independent domain—and 
hence the need for transducers doing the coupling between the physical and the 
mental. But it must be granted that this necessity is an artefact arising from the 
assumed Cartesian framework. It seems that there has to be a conversion between the 
symbolic contents of the mind and the physical processes of the body, but only because 
the separation between the ontological domains is supposed to be fundamental. The 
assumption of neurocentrism as well forces one to conceive of an intelligent agent as 
responding primarily to internal representations when coping, rather than to the 
environment or to the world, which most certainly biases the orientation toward 
representation and away from perception.  
Looked more closely, not only abstracting Dasein from the worldhood of the world 
(Weltlichkeit der Welt) is preposterous. Take, for instance, the move or play in a game as 
pointed out by Haugeland: 
pushing around a little piece of plastic shaped like a turret could only amount to 
a rook move in an appropriate spatial and temporal context of other chess pieces 
and moves. To call it a rook move apart from such context is simply nonsense. 
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Likewise, so the reasoning goes, to regard any phenomenon as intentional or 
normative in isolation from the relevant whole, is also nonsense. And since, in the 
case of mental attribution, the relevant whole must include the individual’s 
environment and/or community, the Cartesian independence of the mental is 
impossible. (1998, p. 208) 
It should then not come as a surprise that Heidegger’s phenomenology of world is 
invoked in conjunction with the attempt to escape from the Cartesian mindset. The 
idea of a neo-Heideggerian framework, from whence to rethink the cognitive 
enterprise away from Cartesian ways of thinking, has cavorted Wheeler’s mind at least 
ten years (see 1995) prior to publication of his Reconstructing the Cognitive World (2005). 
But Wheeler’s idea is not only critical but, above all, constructive. His framework is 
neo-Heideggerian because Wheeler cannot simply buy the ‘anthropocentric 
tendencies’ in Heidegger’s philosophy (1995, p. 69) and wants to extend accordingly 
the consequences of the Heideggerian framework to the animal kingdom. This is due 
to the Muggle constraint, which guides obligingly Wheeler’s investigation: 
In J. K Rowlings’s Harry Potter books, there are two coexisting and intersecting 
worlds. The first is the magical realm, populated by wizards, witches, dragons, 
dementors, and the like. This is a realm in which, for example, getting from A to 
B can be achieved by flying broomstick, flying carpet, or more dramatically, 
teleportation, and in which one object can be transformed into another by a 
transfiguration spell. The second world is the nonmagical realm, populated by 
Muggles—Muggles like us. Muggles, being nonmagical folk, are condemned to 
travel by boringly familiar (to us) planes, trains, and automobiles, and to operate 
without the manifest benefits of supernatural object-altering powers. Now, if you 
want to understand of how Muggles work, you had better not appeal to anything 
magical. (2005, p. 4-5)   
The point is simple: “no spooky stuff allowed” (2005, p. 5). So Wheeler is ready to 
incorporate Heidegger’s phenomenology of agency within the context of the 
environing world (Umwelt) to bear on cognitive science, but he is not willing to 
abandon what he calls an intellectual marriage of philosophy and science (2005, p. 4). 
No ‘spooky stuff’ means also, in Wheeler’s terms, that no occult entities unbeknownst 
to scientific inquiry are to be let in: “if philosophy and natural science clash (in the 
sense that philosophy demands the presence of some entity, state, or process that is 
judged to be inconsistent with natural science), then it is philosophy and not science 
that must give up” (2005, p. 5). This can be couched in the following terms: philosophy 
is all right, but in this intellectual marriage demanded by Wheeler, it is science the one 
with preeminence when it comes to the postulation of existing objects. Escaping the 
Cartesian mindset does not impose on us an obligation of forsaking the grounds of a 
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scientifically informed philosophy. We are, after all, Muggles, and must abide by 
nonmagical methods and by the constraints they impose.  
For the aforementioned intellectual marriage between philosophy and science to 
be effective, the phenomenology of agency in the environing world cannot simply have 
emerged out of nothing. On Wheeler’s account, to suppose so would be ‘spooky.’ So 
somehow sense has to be made about how such an instance of meaningful structures, 
like Dasein’s environing world, has arisen from more primordial biological structures. 
According to Wheeler, evolutionary biology provides a treatment of other animals 
which does not consider them under the light of value-free objects (that is, as present-
at-hand entities) but rather as creatures immersed in their natural niches that can also 
be said to carry out intelligent, at least meaningful, activities. On Wheeler’s view, 
Heidegger’s conception of animals is not far from Descartes’s derogatory idea that 
animals are mere automata. It is no secret that, for Heidegger, animals have no world 
and do not exist in the sense of Dasein’s existence. Instead, animals are ‘world poor’ 
(weltarm) and are absorbed in captivation (Benommenheit):’ “captivation is the condition 
of possibility for the fact that, in accordance with its essence, the animal behaves 
[benimmt sich] within an environment [Umgebung] but never within a world [Welt]” (GA 
29/30, pp. 347-348). But this Heideggerian opposition between Umgebung and Welt—
which Heidegger imports from biologist Jakob von Uexküll—appears rather 
extravagant and untenable to Wheeler, who does not shy away from accusing 
Heidegger of anthrochauvinism (2005, p. 157). Perhaps the human Welt is more 
elaborate than the animal Umgebung, but one cannot be dismissive of the fact that 
humans are also animals.  
This is the step forward towards naturalism that Wheeler invites his readers to 
take: the world has to be somehow a continuation of the biological environment. An 
abismal gap between Dasein and other animals can be granted on the basis of human 
cultural evolution, but it cannot be forever unsurmountable, for Dasein was once a 
‘mere’ animal. Dasein, to be clear, is still an animal, albeit provided with a set of tools 
for thinking which function as imagination-extenders and focus-holders (Dennett 
2013). Neither can be supposed that all living beings are encapsulated in their own 
irreductible worlds which do not communicate with other worlds—as Jakob von 
Uexküll (2010) would have it—since evolution requires continuity between species, 
interrelationship, and kinship between all species; an idea that von Uexküll would 
nevertheless pin on the illusion founded on the belief in an unitary world shared by all 
existing creatures (Agamben 2002, p. 50).4   
4 On von Uexküll’s view, animal worlds are not only unknown worlds but, more importantly, they are 
invisible and inaccesible from our own human perspective. A mechanistic view of nature contributes to 
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Rejecting Heidegger’s claim to human exceptionalism, Wheeler now turns to a 
difference between the physical and the biological sciences that can be couched in 
terms of a distinctive treatment toward behavioral ecology: “this area of biology (at 
least) cannot be treated as equivalent to the physical sciences. In fact, it seems that for 
the discipline of behavioral ecology to make sense, the capacity of animals to open up 
domains of significance has to be assumed” (Wheeler 1995, p. 72). And again, even if 
these domains are not as rich and manifold as the ones opened up by humans, they are 
nonetheless evolutionary antecedents of human existence. Wheeler’s argument is the 
following: one can certainly concede that there is an abstraction of meaningful 
contexts in physics, for which Vorhandenheit can, no doubt, be said even to be its sole 
business, but this is incorrect in the case of living organisms. After all, it is thanks to 
evolutionary theory that a continuity between animal species must be granted, so that 
human intelligence—for all its distinctiveness—can be traced back to more primitive 
forms of interaction with the environment. Human beings and their creations 
(including knowledge, language, and morality) are a byproduct of evolutionary 
history.5 The meaningful structures constituting Dasein’s world are no exception. 
Wheeler has it that even if we consider living organisms to be objects, our scientific 
findings are not up to us, since animals are “autonomous agents who adopt strategies 
with fitness consequences for both the strategy adopting animal itself, and the other 
animals with whom it interacts” (idem). We might want to theorize animals as if they 
were mere objects, but they are rather living organisms with coping and survival 
strategies. They might be weltarm, but they are not weltlos. For this very reason, we 
cannot conceive of animals as though we were dealing with inanimate things, for our 
objective (present-at-hand) stance towards them is just our stance, but not theirs. A real 
science of living organisms must provide a detailed account of how animals behave 
and develop, and not just envisage them as something they are not. So this explains 
Wheeler’s piecemeal approach to Heideggerian philosophy: Dasein, as an evolved 
creature, has also had to learn to cope with its world and this is why it would be a 
mistake to attempt to abstract it away from an evolutionary approach. Now it is clear 
why Wheeler’s approach is neo-Heideggerian: it accepts Heidegger’s phenomenology 
of Dasein’s world as an accurate description of the structures of coping within the 
practical context of human agency, but Wheeler does not see why simpler forms of 
animal intelligence cannot be integrated into a more encompassing picture. What 
impedes one from conceiving of meaning as pervading the worlds of other animals? 
this inaccessibility: “whoever wants to hold on to the conviction that all living things are only machines 
should abandon all hope of glimpsing their environments” (2010, p. 41).  
5 For a succinct account of evolutionary theory bearing on knowledge, language, and morality, see Ruse 
(2012). 
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Why would anyone think that Dasein is the only exception in the whole of the animal 
kingdom? 
It is worth remarking that this line of thinking can also be applied to artificial life 
(A-Life for short) research: the field of study associated with systems related to life, its 
processes and evolution by means of computer simulations, robotics, and biochemistry. 
Wheeler takes A-Life in the restricted sense of being an attempt to explain 
evolutionary and adaptive systems, including phenomena customarily grouped 
together with labels such as intelligence, mind, and cognition (1995, p. 65, n. 1). 
Wheeler addresses this possibility via the example of cellular automata. According to 
Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1993), Bittorio, a ring of eighty elementary processing 
units (cellular automata) in a random soup of 1s and 0s endowed with a network 
architecture and coupling properties, can illustrate how very simple organisms—even 
artificial ones—can begin to enact a world by exhibiting emergent properties. As a 
cellular automata, Bittorio can demonstrate various kinds of fantastic emergent 
behavior according to the state of neighboring cells, since the state of one of its cells is 
replaced by a perturbation when one of the two alternatives (0 or 1) is encountered. So 
the experimenter needs only to stipulate the possible states into which each unit is able 
to move, the rules governing the way the units change as a result of local interactions 
with neighboring units, and the way in which the network is coupled to a random 
milieu. What is interesting is that a Bittorio “picks up or singles out from the milieu a 
very specific subset, namely, finite odd sequences, since only these sequences induce a 
repeatable change in Bittorio’s configuration” (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1993, p. 
152). The conclusion is rather surprising: “given its rule and given its form of structural 
coupling, this Bittorio becomes an odd sequence recognizer” (idem). For what is worth, 
Wheeler thinks that here the system’s activity can be understood as a sort of minimal 
interpretation, meaning that Bittorio “selects or brings forth a domain of significance 
out of the background of its random milieu” (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1993, p. 
156). Varela et al. do not refrain a single step back from speaking of ‘Bittorio’s world:’  
It should be apparent that this world is not pregiven and then recovered through 
a representation. We did not design Bittorio to be an odd sequence recognizer; 
we simply provided Bittorio with certain internal dynamics and then dropped it 
into a random milieu. Nevertheless, given the history of coupling between the 
internal dynamics and the milieu, odd sequence becomes a significant distinction for 
Bittorio. For this reason, we describe Bittorio’s world as enacted through a 
history of structural coupling. (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1993, p. 156)   
According to Varela, Thompson and Rosch, Bittorio can be conceived of as “a 
minimal example of how an autonomous system brings forth significance from a 
background” (idem). The point reinforces Wheeler’s idea that such a simple system’s 
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activity performs a minimal kind of interpretation and, what is more interesting, it 
might help us understand how an agent’s ongoing activity brings forth significance 
from an essentially meaningless background (Wheeler 1995, p. 70).  
So basically, the neo-Heideggerian approach demands that Heideggerian 
philosophy meet the Muggle constraint. Orthodox cognitive science restricted itself to 
offline intelligence, that is, to phenomena involving propositional knowing-what, like 
weighing up the pros and cons of carrying out a certain action in a specific situation 
(Wheeler 2005, p. 12). In contrast, the new approach is ready to do both: subsume 
GOFAI by allowing it an authoritative place in offline phenomena research (Wheeler 
2005, p. 249), while at the same time investigating the largely unexplored dimension of 
online intelligence comprising the sort of phenomena characteristic of agents that 
produce a suite of fluid and flexible real-time adaptive responses to incoming sensory 
stimuli. And this sort of intelligence—albeit more complex and sophisticated in 
humans—is not a privilege of Dasein alone but is scattered in the chain of being, from 
nonhuman animals to cellular automata.    
It can scarcely be said that Wheeler’s approach is objectionable from a purely 
Heideggerian point of view. Therefore, the next section will attempt to exhibit the 
kinds of objections that can be presented to the neo-Heideggerian approach in 
cognitive science. But this shall not only be attempted from the viewpoint of ‘pure’ 
philosophical musings. The point is rather to show that the naturalization of 
Heidegger—and the naturalization of intentionality which underlies it—is a glaring 
error which belittles human experience. This results from an analytic reception of 
Heidegger. ‘Analytic’ not only in the sense that Heideggerian philosophy is 
appropriated by analytic-trained Anglo-American philosophers, but also in the 
decisive sense that the Heideggerian philosophy which is appropriated for the purposes 
of advancing the new paradigm, pays only attention to specific parts of Division I of 
Sein und Zeit; parts which, in the same vein, are also appropriated very selectively. The 
reception is ‘analytic’ in that it constitutes a very schematic version of Heidegger 
taking precisely his thought out of context (Rehberg 2012, p. 160). In order to complete 
the purposes of this paper, I now turn to the aporias of what can be deemed the 
‘analytic’ reception of Heidegger’s philosophy. This will let us exhibit some criticisms 
directed to Wheeler’s approach explained so far. 
APORIAS OF THE ‘ANALYTIC’ HEIDEGGER 
The heavy import of Heideggerian vocabulary into the new movement in cognitive 
science has, of course, not gone unnoticed for Dreyfus: the pioneer in introducing 
Heideggerian philosophy into the cognitive landscape. Dreyfus’s position on the so-
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called neo-Heideggerian approach is, however, rather critical. According to Dreyfus, 
the approach is plagued with problems and misunderstandings, although he is 
enthused over a “positive account of how Heideggerian AI and an underlying 
Heideggerian neuroscience could solve the frame problem” (2007, p. 254). 
 For Dreyfus, Wheeler’s approach can be deemed critically ‘pseudo Heideggerian 
AI.’ According to Dreyfus’s assessment, this approach has a fake character which is 
revealed by its use of representations. And this sole fact makes it hard for one to deem 
it really Heideggerian in scope. Indeed, Wheeler presents his global project as 
requiring “a defense of action-oriented representation… action-oriented 
representation may be interpreted as the subagential reflection of online practical 
problem solving, as conceived by the Heideggerian phenomenologist. Embodied-
embedded cognitive science is implicitly a Heideggerian venture” (2005, p. 222-223). 
Wheeler admits to having been influenced by Dreyfus’s critique of artificial reason, but 
not without adding one important caveat: Dreyfus’s focus on the problem is wrong 
because his position is a controversial negative assessment of the empirical 
achievements of orthodox AI peppered with arguments against Cartesianism. So more 
than wrong, Dreyfus’s critique of artificial reason is incomplete. That Dreyfus’s 
critique is inconclusive can be confirmed in that it does not offer a way out from the 
most recalcitrant theoretical shortcomings of the traditional approach. So Wheeler has 
it that Dreyfus’s is a purely philosophical take on AI, since a truly cognitive approach 
should offer solutions for those aspects of the traditional way of doing things. If a 
mistake is shown—so seems to be Wheeler’s argument—then solutions leading to 
improvement must be presented as well. Therefore, “it is not any alleged empirical 
failure on the part of orthodox cognitive science, but rather the concrete empirical 
success of a cognitive science with Heideggerian credentials, that, if sustained and 
deepened, would ultimately vindicate a Heideggerian position in cognitive theory” 
(2005, p. 188-189).  
However, Dreyfus doubts of the Heideggerian credentials of Wheeler’s approach 
and retorts that merely in supposing that Heidegger is concerned with subagential 
problem solving and action oriented representations, Wheeler’s project reflects not a step 
further but a regression to some assumptions of traditional cognitive science  (2007, p. 
254). Dreyfus’s critique of Wheeler’s use of Heideggerian philosophy consists in 
pointing out that being-in-the-world is more basic than thinking and solving problems. 
Wheeler’s preoccupation with how to accommodate Heideggerian insights into a 
representational framework is just an artefact created by his theoretical convictions, 
which are cognitive all too cognitive in that they suppose as fundamental the existence 
of a mind which essentially characterizes what human beings are. Wheeler’s 
anthropological motto seems to be thus: human being is cognitive, therefore his essence lies in 
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cognition. In contrast, cognition is for Dreyfus just a derivative product owing its 
existence to the more fundamental social dealings of a practical coper: the human 
agent concerned with her own existence.     
However, it is important at this juncture to draw more general conclusions from 
the appropriation of Heidegger’s philosophy in cognitive science, since both Wheeler 
and Dreyfus share at least the idea that something like a Heideggerian cognitive 
science and a Heideggerian neuroscience is possible. Indeed, that Heidegger’s 
philosophy or phenomenology in general can enter in dialogue with cognitive science 
implies a certain capitulation to some sort of naturalism. In the work of neuroscientist 
Walter Freeman (1999), for instance, Dreyfus finds the key for liberating the mind—or 
in this case, the brain—from the necessity of representations. As such, this is a true 
step forward, according to Dreyfus, in the right direction of founding a Heideggerian 
neuroscience. Let us recall that the brain, according to Freeman, is a nonlinear 
dynamical system which can find and augment significance in the world. On Dreyfus’s 
interpretation of Freeman’s neurodynamics, 
the important point is that Freeman offers a model of learning which is not an 
associationist model according to which, as one learns, one adds more and more 
fixed connections, nor a cognitivist model based on offline representations of 
objective facts about the world that enable offline inferences as to which facts to 
expect next, and what they mean. Rather, Freeman’s model instantiates a 
genuine intentional arc according to which there are no linear causal connections 
nor a fixed library of data, but where, each time a new significance is 
encountered, the whole perceptual world of the animal changes so that the 
significance as directly displayed is contextual, global, and continually enriched. 
(2007, pp. 260-261) 
His great expectations concerning such project in neuroscience explains why in the 
end Dreyfus has not been able to resist a sort of naturalism according to which being-
in-the-world can be traced back to perception-action loops taking place in neural 
activity. Dreyfus might doubt of the Heideggerian credentials of other philosophers, 
but his are in no way established. For Dreyfus, the point is to get the right underlying 
neuroscience with Heideggerian credentials and thus he seems to ignore that such 
expectations are not phenomenological. This agreeable approach with Heideggerian 
credentials, Dreyfus finds in Freeman’s neurodynamics, since Freeman conceives of 
intentionality as requiring “acting to create meaning instead of just thinking” (1999, 
pp. 38-39). On Freeman’s view, neuronal processes are not just computational tasks 
being carried out by billions of semantically blind nanobots, but are instead in 
themselves meaningful-creating processes. This idea—which Freeman thinks is shared 
by philosophers like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, by psychologists like Gibson, and 
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pragmatists like Dewey—“is crucial for interpreting my observations in experiments 
on neural mechanisms of perception in animals” (1999, p. 40). Heidegger’s 
appropriation in neuroscience consists in supposing that the structures comprising 
Dasein’s world can somehow be brought to bear on systems that are found in the 
natural world. This is, incidentally, a perfect contradiction to Heidegger’s Uexküllian 
conviction that the world is exclusively a human phenomenon.6      
The preceding points bring to the fore the problematic character of Dreyfus’s 
hopes for a Heideggerian neuroscience. He seems to think that the difference between 
machines, animals, and humans can be sorted out, if not by sheer adding a bit of 
complexity to computational machinery, at least by parting from the right 
neuroscience and then from a correct conception of embodiment and embedding: “to 
program Heideggerian AI, we would not only need a model of the brain functioning 
underlying coupled coping as Freeman’s, but we would also need—and here’s the 
rub—a model of our particular way of being embedded and embodied such that what 
we experience is significant for us in the particular way that it is” (Dreyfus 2007, p. 
265). So Dreyfus sets a high standard for the Heideggerian alternative to be fruitful, 
but the possibility of designing a program of being-in-the-world is not declared as 
forever unviable, nor is the underlying assumption that being-in-the-world starts in 
very basic natural processes, ultimate denizens of brain activity, denied intelligibility. 
The typical objection against Dreyfus that his critique of artificial reason is just an in-
principle argument is then completely false.   
However, there are more critical factors at work from the phenomenological point 
of view than Dreyfus has been able to reckon with. As a matter of fact, according to a 
fundamental phenomenological insight, there is something profoundly misleading in 
attempting to naturalize consciousness. Indeed, Husserl has been vocal over and over 
again against the perverseness (Verkehrtheit) of the naturalization of consciousness, 
because it obfuscates (macht blind) “not only the I but everything that is characteristic of 
consciousness” (Hua VII, p. 105 ff).  The subjective is, for Husserl, unreal from the 
point of view of the real (“gegenüber der Realität eine Irrealität,” [Hua IV, p. 64]). 
Moreover, “as long as naturalism suffices, there reigns… the theoretical blindness for 
the specificities of the mind [das Spezifische des Geistes]” (Hua XXXVII, p. 122 ff). In 
sum, Husserl does not dither from speaking of a nonsensical naturalization of the mind 
(widersinnigen Naturalisierug des Geistes) or a reification of consciousness (Verdinglichung von 
Bewusstsein). Both naturalism in the form of the natural sciences and historicism and 
6 To be more precise, Jakob von Uexküll holds that “every animal, no matter how free in its movement, is 
bound to a certain dwelling-world…” (2010, p. 139). This dwelling-world is incommensurable with the 
human world. Therefore, Heidegger’s denial of a shared world between humans and other animals 
reverberates with Uexküllian overtones. 
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worldview philosophy (Weltanschauungsphilosophie) naturalize respectively consciousness 
and the ideas. As such, naturalism and historicism are nonscientific: not per se but only 
in reference to their absolutism regarding their own methods (Rinofner-Kreidl 2000, p. 
752).  
Be that as it may, Dreyfus conceives (wrongly) of a profound breakthrough 
between his beloved Heidegger-style phenomenology and Husserl’s, and so goes on to 
affirm that since Husserl “put directedness of mental representations at the center of 
his philosophy, he is also beginning to emerge as the father of current research in 
cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence” (1982, p. 2). But given the 
aforementioned Husserlian critique of the naturalization of mind and consciousness, it 
strikes one as puzzling how Husserl can seriously be considered the father of cognitive 
psychology and AI. So if Dreyfus designates Wheeler’s approach pseudo-
Heideggerian, it must be granted that his own approach is not less sui generis, when not 
equally pseudo-phenomenological.  
For similar reasons, it is difficult to see how Heidegger’s phenomenology can be 
accommodated into a naturalistic framework that can meet Wheeler’s Muggle 
constraint. It is Wheeler’s idea, however, that the Heideggerian credentials of his 
project are fully intact (2005, p. 190) and that Heidegger’s philosophy can serve as a 
‘conceptual adhesive’ binding together a well-anchored research program (2005, p. 
191). In order to ground out this marriage between Heidegger’s philosophy and 
cognitive science, Wheeler entertains a rather strange interpretation of Vorhandenheit. 
Although on occasion Heidegger himself seems to refer to present-at-hand in 
derogatory terms (“sondern setzt… die Seinsheit purer Vorhandenheit nur wieder voraus” [SZ § 
21, p. 99], etc.), Wheeler does not think Vorhandenheit is to be interpreted with 
contempt. Instead, Wheeler has it that Heidegger has shown that scientific objects are 
discovered in the world as ‘deworlded’ entities, and because they are only the business 
of science alone, philosophy cannot claim a right to postulate occult entities unknown 
to science. If the business of science is the investigation of deworlded entities, that is, 
inasmuch as they are not dependent on human context bias, philosophy on its part 
must dedicate its efforts to world contextuality and thus can serve as an adhesive 
accompanying scientific endeavors. To put it bluntly: philosophy can clarify the world 
of the deworlded entities of empirical science. Hence, here lies a difference between 
philosophy and science which, according to Wheeler, must not be missed: a difference 
that is also an interplay between the two that clarifies as well how they relate to each 
other. Taking into account a distinction introduced by McDowell (1994), Wheeler 
maintains that empirical science provides an enabling understanding, which reveals the 
causal elements and the organization of the systematic causal interactions between 
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those elements. In contrast, philosophy is characterized by a constructive understanding, 
which concerns the identification, articulation, and clarification of the conditions that 
determine what it is for a phenomenon to be the phenomenon that it is (2012, pp. 182-
183).   
Under the last distinction, Wheeler thinks that Heidegger’s philosophy can be 
depicted as seeking a particular sort of constitutive understanding. Namely: “the 
understanding in question concerns an account of the conditions that determine what 
it means to live a human life” (Wheeler 2012, p. 183). And the recognition of this 
transcendental role of philosophy and the clarifications it brings forth might be also 
illuminating to empirical science. On Wheeler’s view, constructive understanding does 
not have to be reduced to enabling understanding, for that would be tantamount to a 
kind of scientism (2012, p. 185). Rather, “our two kinds of understanding (and thus 
philosophy and cognitive science) will standardly engage in a process of mutual 
constraint and influence that McDowell tags with the enticing phrase a perfectly 
intelligible interplay” (idem). This view of the interplay between empirical science and 
philosophy and thus of the complementariness of phenomenology and cognitive 
science is supplemented by a minimal naturalism: “because it stops a long way short of 
reductionism, minimal naturalism does not demand that a complete cognitive science 
of Dasein would be a complete understanding of Dasein, although it would be a 
complete enabling understanding” (Wheeler 2012, p. 191). At the behest of this 
interplay between the transcendental conditions presupposed by any empirical science 
and Wheeler’s minimal kind of naturalism, it is possible to hold that transcendental 
conditions “are not immune to revision, or even perhaps rejection, in the light of the 
results of the empirical scientific research that they make possible” (Wheeler 2012, p. 
192).     
However, for the phenomenologist, this empirical revision of the transcendental 
sphere—the sole suggestion that empirical results might modify the transcendental 
conditions pervading our understanding—is as absurd (das ist ein reiner Widersinn, as 
Husserl would surely hold) as if one demanded causal properties and relationships etc., 
for mathematical numbers (see Hua XXV). It is important to note that this Husserlian 
transcendental stance has also been thoroughly assumed by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit. 
Heidegger does not refrain from criticizing his phenomenological master from time to 
time, nor from secluding himself from the way Husserl practices phenomenology. But 
Heidegger is surely no pre-Husserlian philosopher, which most certainly means that 
his entire work is not even understandable without the impulses he received from 
Husserlian phenomenology. Precisely, Ratcliffe has criticized Wheeler’s naturalization 
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of Dasein by extracting the following transcendental argument from Division I of 
Heidegger’s magnum opus: 
· Empirical science enquires as to what is the case. In order for it to do so, the 
distinction between being and not being the case must already be intelligible. In 
other words, one must have an understanding of what it is to be. This 
presupposed understanding need not be restricted to the Being of the present-at-
hand, to the kind of Being that empirical science is concerned with, but it does at 
least include it. 
· We are the beings that have an understanding of Being… Hence any 
comprehensive account of human understanding needs to include an account of 
our understanding of Being. 
· Empirical science is concerned with the present-at-hand, rather than with what 
is presupposed by the intelligibility of presence-at-hand; it addresses only what 
kinds of things the world is populated with. Therefore it cannot incorporate an 
adequate account of Dasein. 
· In addition, empirical scientific theories cannot adequately encapsulate the 
having of a world, a characteristic that is inseparable of Dasein. The world we 
find ourselves in, which is made intelligible by our understanding of Being, is a 
world in which we encounter the present-at-hand. It is not itself encountered as 
present-at-hand. The sense of belonging to a world cannot be reduced to an 
encounter with some object. 
· Hence empirical scientific understanding is limited to a restrictive sense of what 
is and fails to accommodate how we already find ourselves in a world when we 
engage in scientific inquiry. (Ratcliffe 2012, pp. 144-145)     
Furthermore, Wheeler errs by supposing that science gives us access to completely 
deworlded objects. On the contrary, “presence-at-hand does not escape readiness-to-
hand but is a kind of abstraction from it” (Ratcliffe 2012, p. 141). It can be said with 
certainty that the possibility of abstracting deworlded things presupposes the world: the 
background in absence of which abstraction does not even makes sense. So the 
question must be raised: how can empirical results concerned with present-at-hand 
objects affect the world precisely presupposed in those endeavors? This shows that 
Wheeler is committed so blindly to the present-at-hand, that his project seems to 
dissociate readiness-to-hand from the world in which it is intelligible, to then situate it 
within a scientific (present-at-hand) context, along with adding an interpretation of it 
in terms of environmental nudges, to finally call it ‘Heideggerian’ (Wheeler 2012, p. 
150). Therefore, the prospects of a Heideggerian cognitive science are criticized by 
Ratcliffe as a confused undertaking: “the project of seeking to understand our being-
in-the-world in cognitive science terms is nonsensical” (2012, p. 138). Two more points 
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can be considered in this regard: (i) Heideggerian topics, when appropriated by a 
naturalistic cognitive science, remain Heideggerian only in a fairly superficial way 
(idem). And (ii) the latter is confirmed by the fact that the same themes cannot be 
incorporated into cognitive science without losing sight of Heidegger’s philosophy and 
their place within it (Ratcliffe 2012, p. 139). 
What is more: when it comes to reading strategies, it appears even more exact to 
designate this sui generis reception of Heideggerian topics into cognitive science as an 
‘analytic interpretation’ of Heidegger and phenomenology in general. Indeed, as 
Rehberg (2012) has argued, the interpretation is selective and schematic in what it 
takes from Heidegger and in what it ignores. So it is not only that analytic-trained 
philosophers are interpreting Heideggerian themes to incorporate them into a 
cognitive science discourse—thus overlooking that it was not Heidegger’s intention in 
the first place to give an account of human cognition or to develop a theory of 
knowledge or a philosophy of mind. It is also that by analytically abstracting some 
selective topics that belong to the whole fabric of Sein und Zeit, the matter of 
Heidegger’s thought is inevitably eradicated. As Rehberg has argued:   
to put aside the issue of Dasein, to translate it into ‘human agency’ as happens in 
the service of the new model of cognitive science, or to re-translate it into 
subjectivity (the very conception from which Heidegger seeks to distance his 
work), is simply to eliminate the meaning of being-in-the-world, whose import in 
Being and Time is precisely to show the derivative nature of any conception of 
human being in which it is reduced to human agency or (any kind of quasi-
Cartesian) subjectivity. (Rehberg 2012, p. 160) 
CONCLUSION 
At least from the phenomenological point of view, there is a nonreducible and 
noncognitive core with which phenomenology concerns itself. The existence of a 
nonreductive core which is safeguarded by phenomenology does not only demonstrate 
that consciousness is irreducible to whatever physical processes but, more importantly, 
that philosophical questioning is nonisomorphic with the theoretical attitude of the 
natural sciences.  
The problem of Wheeler’s approach seeking a close connection with empirical 
findings is precisely that this nonisomorphism, the crucial and unique place that is to 
be conferred to philosophy alone, might go astray when confronted with the 
seductions of naturalism. For it is the assumption of naturalism what led Wheeler to 
warn philosophers of not postulating occult entities. However, the critical question 
must be asked: is this really what philosophy is about? It would be interesting to note—
and I say this with outright irony—which entities and natural processes have been 
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introduced by phenomenologists that are inconsistent with empirical science! We can 
be sure at least of this: Husserl did not offer a neuroscientific theory of phenomenality 
and Heidegger’s cognitive psychology is nowhere to be found. So it is rather striking 
that someone would suggest that one should beware of the theoretical objects being 
postulated by phenomenology, when certainly neither Husserl nor Heidegger were in 
the business of populating their ‘theories’ with objects challenging those processes 
investigated by empirical science. Neither Husserl nor Heidegger presented scientific 
investigations. So let us be clear at this juncture: there is no phenomenological theory 
of mind, if by ‘mind’ one understands an ontic region, whose law-like physical 
processes have to be addressed and explained by means of empirical methods. If we 
are not aware of Heidegger’s theory concerning the neural correlates of consciousness 
or Husserl’s ideas on how to design a quantum computer, the reason is because they 
do not present us with any kind of theory regarding natural (not even artificial) 
phenomena. Phenomenology does not postulate entities whatsoever, neither natural 
nor cultural, and it certainly does not concern itself with the law-like causality 
governing natural processes. Instead, its task is to investigate the very basis that makes 
it possible for science to construct theories populated by such objective invariances and 
the very constitution of the experience which allows for those objects to appear as 
meaningful. Following Husserl, this transcendental field that is revealed by 
phenomenology also discloses a transcendental subjectivity that cannot simply be 
identified with any constituted entity, whether natural or cultural. The transcendental 
sphere is, then, always relied on when postulating theories about consciousness or the 
mind, “while not realizing that we are doing so, since whether acknowledged or not, it 
is the unspoken concomitant of everything we think and believe” (Olafson 1987, p. 
256).   
I think in conclusion that Wheeler’s work is full of interesting insights and he is 
certainly one of the most important researchers involved in the new wave of cognitive 
studies with a phenomenological bent. However, as I have attempted to show in this 
paper, Wheeler’s Heideggerian credentials are not incontestable, nor Dreyfus’s. So 
maybe it is time for detranslating Heidegger in order to show not only that he did not 
concern himself with the cognitive but above all that his philosophy was so decisively 
anti-Cartesian that he even deconstructed the subject-based philosophy which first and 
foremost provides the basis for the cognitive discourse.   
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